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1JWI.ONEY IS CERTAINLY one of the greatest
inventions of mankind. As Brunner and Meltzer
(1971) have noted, its vast social productivity
arises from the enormous reduction in transac-
tions and information costs that it provides by
serving as a standardized medium of exchange.’
Of course, these benefits, like those of any other
good or service, are not provided at zero cost.
The revenue received from producing and
maintaining a nation’s money stock covers its
production costs and, perhaps) some profit as
well for its producers.
In monetary economics, the revenue from
money creation is called “seigniorage.” Unfor-
tunately, this term has been subject to a variety
of interpretations in the literature. After review-
ing several traditional definitions, this article de-
velops a new seigniorage measure, extended
monetary seigniorage, and shows how it is dis-
tributed between the Federal Reserve, member
banks and the U.S. Treasury during the 1951-90
period. Then, it examines the relationship be-
tween inflation and seigniorage during this peri-
od and shows that this relationship is analogous
to the well-known “i,affer curve” that relates
tax rates and tax revenues: seigniorage in-
creases as inflation rises until the inflation rate
reaches about 7 percent; thereafter, inflation
and seigniorage are inversely related. Indeed,
for each percentage point rise in inflation above
7 percent, the U.S. Treasury’s share of seig-
niorage fell, on average, by $1.4 billion (meas-




The term “seigniorage” dates back to the early
Middle Ages, when it was common for sover-
eigns of many countries to finance some of
their expenditures from the profits they earned
States:
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1See Brunner and Meltzer (1971).from the coinage of money. In the money litera-
ture, seigniorage has often been used inter-
changeably for either the total revenue or the
profit derived from money production and
maintenance. Of course, revenues and profits
are identical only if costs are zero. Although
theoretical analysis can be simplified by assum-
ing that costs are zero, this assumption cannot
be maintained in empirical applications. Since
this article focuses on the empirical issues as-
sociated with seigniorage, the total revenue, cost
and profits associated with money production
must be carefully distinguished and the relevant
notion of seigniorage must be clearly defined.
Tn the analysis that follows, seigniorage is de-
fined as the revenue associated with money
production and maintenance, rather than the
resulting profit. Also, the focus is on the reve-
nue accruing to the government and, therefore,
on the creation of monetary base rather than
the creation of deposits by private depository
institutions.
Monetary theorists have used two main con-
cepts of seigniorage in analyzing its relationship
to inflation. These concepts are termed “oppor-
tunity cost seigniorage” and “monetary seig-
niorage.”
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As its name indicates, opportunity cost seig-
niorage defines seigniorage as the total “oppor-
tunity costs” of money holders. It asks the
question, What additional real income would in-
dividuals have earned if they had held interest-
earning assets instead of non-interest-earning
money? The real interest earnings foregone by
holding money are called its opportunity cost.
Real opportunity cost seigniorage (~~) is:
(1) s~, = rB/P,
where B denotes total base money holdings, r is
the representative nominal rate of return on as-
sets other than base money and Pi sthe con-
sumer price level.
This concept of seigniorage has been used as
an elegant tool of theoretical analysis.~Its ana-
lytical attraction is that it derives the value of
seigniorage from the individuals’ valuation of
the services of money. It does this by identify-
ing seigniorage with the interest income that in-
dividuals voluntarily forego by holding some of
their wealth as money instead of as earning as-
sets. This concept, however, presents some
problems when it is used for empirical studies
of seigniorage.
i’o make the concept of opportunity cost seig-
niorage operational for empirical analysis, some
actual nominal rate of return must be chosen as
the measure of the representative rate of return
(r) in equation I. Estimates of seigniorage will
differ widely depending on which rate of
return — for example, the federal funds rate,
the average yield on government bonds or the
rate of return on stocks of, say, the computer
industry — is used. Thus, the problem is to de-
termine a weighted average of observable asset
returns that meaningfully approximates the true
opportunity cost of money holders.
There is also a conceptual problem with using
this definition of seigniorage: opportunity cost
seigniorage does not equal the monetary author-
ity’s actual revenue from money creation.3 Be-
cause the structure of the monetary authority’s
portfolio differs markedly from the asset struc-
ture preferred by private investors, opportunity
cost seigniorage does not provide a measure of
the gains to the monetary authority from money
creation and maintenance.
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The concept of monetary seigniorage permits
a more straightforward and unambiguous em-
pirical measurement. Monetary seigniorage (sc)
is defined as the net change in base money out-
standing (AB), deflated by the consumer price
level (P):
(2) s~ = AB/P.
Monetary seigniorage measures the transaction
value of non-monetary assets that money holders
trade in to the monetary authority to obtain the
desired increase in their base money balances
(aB). Because the data necessary to calculate this
measure are easily available, the concept of
25ee Bailey (1956), Johnson (1969), Auernheimer (1974)
and Barro (1982).
3For a different view, see Gros (1989), p. 2. He interprets
equation 1 to represent ‘the interest savings the govern-
ment obtains by being able to issue zero interest rate
securities in the form of currency.” This interpretation,
however, is valid only if the nominal rate of return (r)
equals the effective yield on government debt and operat-
ing costs are zero.31
monetary seigniorage has been widely used and
measured by monetary economists.4
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Unfortunately, the traditional concept of
monetary seigniorage does not provide a com-
plete account of the government’s revenue from
base money provision. It abstracts from the ac-
tual process of base money creation and, there-
fore, neglects the fact that the total flow of
revenue in addition depends on the asset struc-
ture of the central bank.
The total flow of seigniorage to the govern-
ment consists of two components. The first is
the real value of the non-monetary assets that
the central bank receives from the public in ex-
change for an increase in the monetary base.
This is measured by the traditional concept of
monetary seigniorage as defined above. The se-
cond component is the interest earnings the
central bank receives on its stocks of non-
government debt.
Since domestic private and foreign debtors
have to service the debt held by the central
bank, there is a flow of seigniorage to govern-
ment even if the public does not desire to in-
crease its cash balances. It is important to note,
however, that only the interest earnings on
non-government debt qualify. The Treasury’s
payment of interest on its debt held by the cen-
tral bank is an inside transaction between gov-
ernment institutions that does not affect the
resource transfer from the private money
holders to government. Finally note that the
central bank occasionally realizes capital gains
(losses) by subsequently selling assets in the
open market at higher (lower) prices than it had
purchased them.
To take these additional components of the
revenue from base money production and main-
tenance into account, let the interest rates on
the monetary authority’s holdings of private
domestic debt (D) and official foreign debt (F) be
denoted by d and f, respectively, and unrealized
capital gains by G1~Then, the extended mone-
tary seigniorage, s~1,is:
(3) s~= s~ + (dD + fF + G5)/P.
Extended monetary seigniorage encompasses the
traditional measure of monetary seigniorage.
The new concept provides the seigniorage meas-
ure best suited for this study for two reasons.
First, it directly measures the total real net flow
of assets that the Federal Reserve System and
U.S. Treasury receive from their monopoly over
base money production; second, it can readily
be computed from available data.
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An analysis of extended monetary seigniorage
in the United States can begin at either of two
points: the “sources” side shows us how the
gains were achieved, while the “uses” side tells
us who received the gains.
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From the sources side, the extended monetary
seigniorage is shown by equation 3. In more de-
tail, it can be written as:
(4) s\f = CAB + dD + fF + G5)/P
where B = C + RB + R~.
It is important to note that, in this analysis, the
monetary base (B) is defined more broadly than
is usually the case. Here, official foreign deposits
at the Federal Reserve System (RE) are added to
the usual monetary base components of curren-
cy in circulation (C) and reserves of depository
institutions (R8).5 This expanded definition is ap-
propriate because the Federal Reserve obtains
seigniorage from producing foreign deposits in
precisely the same way it does from producing
deposits for domestic depository institutions.
To develop the uses side of extended mone-
tary seigniorage, two financial accounts are uti-
lized: (1) the combined Federal Reserve-’I’reasury
“monetary” balance sheet and (2) the income
statement of the Federal Reserve System.
4See Friedman (1971), Calvo (1978), Fischer (1982), Dorn-
busch (1988), Grilli (1989) and Klein and Neumann (1990).
foreign governments, and international organizations, like
IMF and World Bank; it excludes the Treasury’s Exchange
Stabilization Fund. 5’Foreign deposits” include the demand balances of for-
eign central banks, the Bank of International Settlements,The U.S. monetary authorities’ combined bal-
ance sheet can be written in first-difference
form to show the changes that have occurred
over some specific time period as follows:
(5) AA~ + AD + AF + AC~ + AOA
= AB + ARE, + AK.
The left-hand side of equation S describes the
changes in the Federal Reserve’s assets that sup-
ply funds: outright purchases of U.S. Treasury
and federal agency obligations (AA~~), loans to
depository institutions via the discount window
and government securities bought under repur-
chase agreements (AD), the acquisition of gold,
special drawing rights, and foreign exchange
(AF), issuance of coin by the Treasury (ACe) and
other Federal Reserve net assets (AOA).6
The right-hand side of equation S describes
the changes in the factors that absorb these
funds: the monetary base (AB), deposits of the
Treasury (ARG) and the Federal Reserve System’s
capital accounts (AK)! Again, note that the mon-
etary base definition used in this analysis in-
cludes foreign deposits (R1,) held at the Federal
Reserve.
The Fed’s income statement is summarized in
equation 6. The left-hand side describes the
Fed’s current income and expenses that give
rise to its net revenue; the right-hand side of
equation 6 shows how the Fed’s net revenue is
distributed.
(6) dD + fF + aA1~,+ G5 + G~— OC~
= Y9+ YF.B + YGN
As noted earlier, d and f represent the inter-
est rates that the Federal Reserve receives on its
loans to the domestic private sector and its in-
ternational assets, respectively; similarly, “a”
denotes the average interest return it receives
on its portfolio of government securities bought
outright.”
The next two terms are the “realized” profits
(Ga) that the Fed receives from sales of its bonds
and foreign assets at prices above those that it
paid for them, and the “unrealized” profits (G~,)
that result from the Fed’s practice of marking
the prices of its foreign exchange holdings to
their market value. This accounting practice
was introduced in 1978; before foreign exchange
holdings were valued at historical rates.9
The term (OC~5)measures the current operat-
ing costs or expenses of the Reserve Banks and
the Federal Reserve Board minus the fees and
reimbursements that the System collects for the
services it sells to the banking industry, the
Treasury and other government agencies. These
service fees and reimbursements are “netted
out” to remove receipts and expenses that are
presumably unrelated to the Federal Reserve
System’s monetary authority role.
The right-hand side of equation 6 shows how
the Federal Reserve’s net revenue (Y) is distri-
buted. The Fed pays its member banks statutory
dividends (Y5) on their paid-in capital and uses
an amount Y~5~ which is equal to .SAK, to raise
the Reserve Banks’ surplus capital to the level of
its member banks’ paid-in capital. The remain-
der of the System’s net income is transferred to
the U.S. Treasury under the heading of “In-
terest on Federal Reserve notes” (Y~~).’°
Subtracting equation 6 from 5 and using the
identity that the current issuance of coin (ACe)
equals the operating cost of the U.S. Mint (OC~1)
plus the profit to the Treasury on the issuance
of coin (YGC) yields:
5ln contrast to their practice of valuing the domestic assets
at the original purchase price, the Federal Reserve Banks
mark their foreign exchange holdings to the market. As a
consequence, reported changes in the stock of the Feder-
al Reserve System’s international assets include net pur-
chases at the actual transaction values (AF) and valuation
gains (or losses) on the previous stock of these assets if
foreign currency prices have changed. Because these
valuation changes do not directly increase or absorb
reserves, they are not included in equation 5. Incorporat-
ing them explicitly would simply introduce the same value
on both sides of equation 5 and, hence, they would be
“netted out” of the analysis.
7% includes Treasury cash holdings.
°TheFederal Reserve’s international assets include the na-
tion’s gold stock on which it receives no interest earnings.
°MostEuropean central banks do not mark their foreign ex-
change holdings to market values; instead, they evaluate
their holdings at the lowest market price that occurred
since they were acquired. As a result, their income state-
ments never show unrealized profits from their foreign ex-
change holdings; however, they show unrealized losses
whenever the prices of foreign currencies fall below their
acquisition values.
WAs an historical aside, prior to 1933, the income transfer to
the U.S. Treasury was effected as a franchise tax based
on a provision of Section 7 of the Federal Reserve Act.
This provision was repealed in 1933 to permit Reserve
Banks to restore their surplus accounts, after they had
been cut to one-half by the enforced subscription to the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, founded in 1933.(7) AB + dD + fF + GB
= (OCE, + OCM) + YEB + Y5
+ (Y0~
+ Y0~
— aAEB — ARG)
+ A(AFR+ D + F + OA — K)
— G0,
where: B = C + R9
+ RE, and
~GC = ACc — OCM,
YE,, = .SAK.
Dividing equation 7 through by the consumer
price level (P) and using the definition of ex-




M = + 5~+ 5~+ S, +
where: s~ = (OCEB + OCM)/P
SB =
= (Y0~.+ Y5~
+ AAEB — aA7,, — ARG)/P,




Equation 8 shows how the extended monetary
seigniorage in each period is used: (1) s~ is the
cost of providing the public’s desired real base
money balances, including the costs associated
with monetary policy and the Federal Reserve’s
contribution to bank supervision, (2) member
banks receive s,,, the statutory dividends, (3) the
government receives s, for spending purposes,
(4) the Federal Reserve uses s, to increase its
portfolio of assets other than government debt
and (5) the Fed uses s~ to make up for book-
losses resulting from adverse changes in asset
prices.
It is useful to consider in detail the seignior-
age distributed to the U.S. government, which
may be termed “fiscal seigniorage.” Fiscal seig-
niorage can be written in two different ways.
The first way, using the government’s budget
constraint, is
(9a) s~ = (G — T + aA, — AAQ)/P,
where (G — T) is the government’s primary
budget deficit or surplus and aA, is the govern-
ment’s interest expenditure on its debt held out-
side the System (A0). Equation 9a shows that
fiscal seigniorage is the portion of the govern-
ment’s deficit that is not financed by borrowing
from the public (AA0). This means that fiscal
seigniorage contributes to the finance of the
primary budget deficit and of the interest ex-
penditures on debt held by the public (outside
the Federal Reserve System).
The second way of writing fiscal seigniorage,
as shown in equation 8 above, is
(9b) s~ = EYcc + (Yo,x — aAE,,) + A(AER — R5)]/P.
Equation 9b breaks down fiscal seigniorage into
three source components: the net revenue from
issuing coin (Y03, the net revenue received
from the Federal Reserve (Yox -.- aA~,,),and the
net borrowing from Reserve Banks (AA~,,—ARG).’~
The treatment of net borrowing as a source
of fiscal seigniorage is not an obvious one, since
the Fed does not lend directly to the Treasury;
instead it purchases Treasury securities in the
open market. From a purely technical point of
view, the Treasury receives the borrowed funds
from the public on the date of security issue,
not from the Fed at the later date when the
public resells the Securities to the Federal
Reserve.
The above treatment of borrowing can be
justified by the following considerations: First,
from the economic point of view, what counts
is not the first but the final placement of the
Treasury securities. Thus, if the security dealers
do not hold but resell the Treasury securities to
Reserve Banks after a short duration, it is, in
fact, the Fed that supplies the borrowed funds
to the Treasury. At the same time, these trans-
actions permit the security dealers to buy an-
other load of new debt from the Treasury.
Second, the bulk of the Federal Reserve’s pur-
‘1See Klein and Neumann (1990)
‘2ln the theoretical literature, it is usually taken for granted
that the net revenue received from the Federal Reserve
(Y0,, — aAE,,) cannot be negative since the government
receives back as part of the transfer (Y0 ,,) the interest
paid on its debt to the central bank (aA,,). This conclu-
sion, however, holds only if the costs of the monetary
authority are assumed away. In the United States, for ex-
ample, the Treasury’s interest payments to the Fed typical-
ly exceed the Treasury’s income received as “interest on
Federal Reserve notes.”Figure 1
Extended Monetary Seigniorage and Operating Cost
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chases of Treasury securities is at the short-
term end of the maturity spectrum. During the
1980s, for example, 83 percent of the securities
purchased had maturities of less than one year.
For this large portion of newly acquired debt,
the time difference between the public’s buying
and reselling plays no significant role in the em-
pirical analysis below based on annual observa-
tions. Third, some portion of new Treasury
debt issued with maturities exceeding one year
is also purchased by the Federal Reserve during
the year of its issue. Finally, any approximation
error with respect to the annual time unit ceases
to play a role when annual average data for de-
cades are examined below.
Figure 1 shows the magnitudes of the extend-
ed monetary seigniorage (s,,) and the monetary
authorities’ operating costs (se) as measured in
1982/84 dollars, from 1951 to 1990. During the
past four decades, the annual real value of ex-
tended monetary seigniorage has generally risen,
while ranging over that period from —$6 billion
in 1954 to $31 billion in 1986. As figure 1 indi-
cates, a comparatively small portion of this
amount—only about 7 percent on average—was
used to cover the costs of producing the mone-
tary base by the monetary authorities. Conse-
quently, the government’s production of base
money has resulted in sizable and rising net
profits, which are equal to the difference be-
tween the two curves in figure 1.
This result is shown in somewhat different
form in table 1, which provides annual average
data for each of the past four decades. During
the 1980s, the annual real net profit from base
money production and maintenance averaged
more than $14 billion, while, during the l9SOs,
it averaged $1 billion per year. The steepest in-
crease in extended monetary seigniorage oc-
curred in the 1960s, when it jumped to almost
$10 billion annually, on average, up sharplyfrom its 1950’s level. About 80 percent of this
rise resulted from drastic increases in average
reserve requirements during the 1960s.
As table 1 shows, the average annual total
operating costs of the monetary authorities in-
creased by about 50 percent during the 1970s
from its earlier levels. This rise primarily
reflects the Federal Reserve’s efforts to in-
troduce a variety of services in the 1970s as-
sociated with the payments mechanism. The
monetary seigniorage used for covering operat-
ing costs fell in the 1980s when the Fed began
to charge explicitly for these services.”
Dividend payments to member banks on their
paid-in capital (se), which run about $.I billion
per year, and the System’s accounting losses on
its holdings of foreign exchange (s,) represent
fairly negligible uses of the total monetary seig-
niorage. As table I indicates, these accounting
adjustments began in 1978, when the Fed start-
ed valuing its foreign exchange holdings at cur-
rent market prices.’4
During the 1980s, the Federal Reserve System
accounted an annual valuation gain on its for-
eign exchange holdings averaging $380 million.
This gain reflects the appreciation of the
Deutschmark and yen against the dollar from
1985 to 1987 and again in 1989/90. Occasionally,
the Fed also realized profits on foreign ex-
change holdings; they averaged $151 million per
year during the 1980s.
As in all countries, the bulk of the extended
monetary seigniorage went to the government.
l’he average annual flow of fiscal seigniorage
“For example, if the cost of priced services was added to
the operating costs for the 1980s, it would raise the figure
shown by almost 75 percent.
“During the 1970s, the Fed’s realized (as opposed to ac-
counting) losses on foreign exchange amounted to about
$148 million per year in real terms. These losses resulted
from foreign exchange intervention attempts to stem the
sharp decline in the value of the dollar during the 1970s.
They appear, of course, on the sources side of the seig-
niorage equation and, hence, reduce the total monetary
seigniorage collected; see equation 4.
Table 1
The Uses of Extended Monetary Seiqntorage1




M $1,555 $9,847 $14,373 $14,948
— Operating ~ 5c 454 695 1,039 7462
= Net profit 1,101 9,152 13,334 14,202
— Dividend payment to
member banks, s~ 67 100 101 96
— Book-loss on foreign
exchange,
5
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$11,202 = Fiscal seigniorage, s5
Memo:
Traditional monetary
seigniorage, 5~ $1,498 $9,683 $14,414 $13,945
Fiscal seigniorage as
percent of real federal
on-budget spending tO% 2.8% 2.1% 1.6%
1Annual averages in millions of dollars, 1982/84 consumer prices. 2Net of revenue from priced services ($501 million).
‘Starting in 1978.Table 2
The Components of Fiscal Seigniorage’
...1!5160 196170 -- 1971-80 198190
U S. government debt
bought outright by Fed 52,295 810.525 512.117 810.462
* Interest received or, FR-
notes net of interest
paid to Fed —529 —541 — 1,233 455
Con issueo net of
outlays of US Mint 591 428 1.092 587
— Change in Treasurys
deposits with Fed 74 —201 —621 —302
= Fiscal scigniorage $2,431 $10211 811.355 $11202
Memo-
Interest received on FR-
notes $1671 85.214 810-189 $15954
Interest paio to Federal
Reserve $2,200 S 5.755 811.722 $15,499
‘Annual averages n miliions of dollars. 1982/84 consumer prices
rose from $2.4 billion during the 1950s to
$11.2 billion in the 1980s. The dominating source
component of fiscal seigniorage is the outright
acquisition of government securities by the Fed.
Just how important it is can be seen in table 2;
for all practical purposes, it matches the total.
This observation underscores the fact that the
seigniorage flow to government must not be
identified with the Fed’s payment to the Treasu-
ry of “interest on Federal Reserve notes.” In ser-
vicing the debt held by the Fed, the Treasury
makes interest payments of roughly the same
order of magnitude as the Fed pays to the
‘rreasury (see the bottom lines in table 2)13 In-
deed, the Fed’s portfolio of U.S. government
securities can be interpreted as an interest-free
loan to the Treasury.
While during the 1970s and the 1980s fiscal
seigniorage amounted to 80 percent of mone-
tary seigniorage collected, it even exceeded the
total flow during the 1950s and the 1960s. How
was it possible that the government consumed
more seigniorage than was collected? The an-
swer to that question is asset substitution in
favor of U.S. government debt: for a given base
money stock, the Fed can reduce its loans to
the banking sector or sell foreign assets and use
the proceeds for buying outright government
debt. For example, if the Fed replaces foreign
assets worth $100 million with Treasury bills of
the same amount, it foregoes foreign interest
earnings of, say, $5 million. As a result, the cur-
rent flow of fiscal seigniorage is increased by
$95 million (see equation 9b).” To be sure, this
is a one-time effect. During subsequent periods,
the flow of fiscal seigniorage will be smaller
than otherwise, because of the lost stream of
foreign interest earnings.
As table 1 indicates, the observed differences
between the annual flows of monetary and fis-
cal seigniorage are largely due to asset substitu-
tion. During the 1950s and the 1960s, the Fed
“Barro (1982) was not aware of this, when he identified the
interest on Federal Reserve notes as the revenue from
money creation. But note that Barro would be correct if
the Fed, like the Deutsche Bundesbank, would mainly hold
earning assets other than government debt.
“While the discussed transaction reduces the Fed’s interest
earnings on foreign assets, it raises the interest earnings
on the portfolio of Treasury securities. But, as noted
above, this does not affect the net flow of fiscal seig-
niorage.raised the annual flow of fiscal seigniorage above
the flow of extended monetary seigniorage by
replacing non-government debt worth more
than $1 billion each year, on average, with U.S.
government securities. The reverse policy was
chosen thereafter so that the annual flow of
fiscal seigniorage fell behind monetary seignior-
age by an average of almost $4 billion during
the 1980s.
While the continuous flow of fiscal seigniorage
helps to finance the federal budget, it is a fairly
small source of funds. On average, it contrib-
uted about 2 percent to the finance of federal
expenditures over the past 40 years.
Sei,gnftjiag~and InJlatimi
In the monetary economics literature, seig-
niorage is often discussed and analyzed in terms
of an “inflation tax,” a term that was coined by
Milton Friedman (1953). This association reflects
the fact that, other things the same, a nation’s
monetary authorities can increase monetary
seigniorage by increasing the supply of base
money relative to its demand. Because the re-
sulting rising price level reduces the real value
of the public’s base money holdings, the public
will demand more nominal base money balances
to make up for the price-level-induced decline in
its real cash balances. As a result, the price rise
produces an increase in monetary seigniorage.
Extended monetary seigniorage, however, will
not rise in some fixed proportion to inflation;
the demand for real cash balances is inversely
related to the rate of inflation. Hence, the in-
crease in seigniorage associated with higher and
higher inflation becomes smaller and smaller;
eventually, some inflation rate is reached at
which monetary seigniorage is maximized.
‘I’hereafter, higher inflation will reduce the level
of seigniorage as the inflation-induced effect
dominates the price-level effect on the public’s
demand for real cash balances.
In sum, monetary theory predicts that seig-
niorage rises with inflation but falls once the in-
flation rate has passed a certain threshold. Thus,
the predicted relation resembles the shape of
the Laffer curve in public finance wheie the
revenue from the income tax first rises with the
effective tax rate but begins to decline once the
disincentive effect of too high a tax rate be-
comes dominant.
Monetary theorists have applied profit-maxi-
mizing conditions for a monetary authority to
generate the seigniorage-maximizing rate of in-
flation.’~This concept, however, is unlikely to
yield much insight in the actual behavior of
monetary authorities. While, in history, mone-
tary authorities of several countries have re-
peatedly produced larger inflations in the
attempt to accommodate fiscal problems, central
banks, in general, are not profit-oriented organi-
zations, and ascribing pi-ofit-maximizing motives
to them is misleading.”
Thus, instead of looking for some theoretically
justified story about inflation and the motives of
the Federal Reserve System, we are better off
by simply looking at the “stylized facts” about
the relationship between inflation and the ex-
tended monetary seigniorage in the United States.
Figure 2 provides one way of assessing this rela-
tionship. The points in the diagram show the
rate of inflation and the associated monetary
seigniorage in each year from 1951 to 1990. As
expected, the data reveal an initial positive rela-
tionship between inflation and extended mone-
tary seigniorage. As also expected, however, this
positive association slowly disappears, then be-
comes negative for sufficiently high rates of
inflation. Thus, the empirical relationship resem-
bles the shape of a Laffer curve.
The curve drawn in figure 2 shows the re-
sults of estimating extended monetary seignior-
age (sM) as a quadratic function of the rate of
inflation (it):
(10) s,~ = a0
+ a~n— a2n’ + e,
where e is a white-noise residual. The estimated
parameters imply that monetary seigniorage be-
“Consider the traditional concept of monetary seigniorage,
as defined above by equation 2. It can be rewritten as:
(a) s~, = (ABfB)(B/p).
Next, assume a standard money demand function:
(b) B/p = y exp[—A(r +
where (y) is real income, (r) is the real rate of interest and
n the inflation rate. Finally, assume a steady-state equilibri-
um in which y and rare constant. This implies: it = AB/B.
Maximizing equation a subject to equation b yields the
seigniorage-maximizing rate of inflation:
(c) n°P~= 1/A.
“For a different view, see Toma (1982).Figure 2
























gins to decline once inflation exceeds a rate of
7.9 percent.”
From the point of view of the U.S. govern-
ment, fiscal seigniorage is more interesting than
monetary seigniorage because the former meas-
ures what the government actually receives for
budget finance. As figure 3 shows, fiscal seig-
niorage is quite similarly related to the level of
inflation, except that it reaches a maximum at
an inflation rate of 7.2 percent.’°
These estimates suggest that high inflation, at
least more than 7 percent or 8 percent per
year, has been less profitable for the U.S.
government when monetary or fiscal seig-
niorage alone are considered. This is demon-
strated in table 3, where average annual
seigniorage flows are compared over different
inflation ranges. During the high inflation years,
when inflation exceeded 9 percent annually, fis-
cal seigniorage averaged 7.7 billion per year.
This is about 5 percent lower than it averaged
during the low inflation years and even 45 per-
cent lower than during the medium inflation
years.”
The government’s monopoly in issuing base
money yields profits that facilitate its fiscal
IsEstimating equation 10 with a dummy for 1986 yields:
a,, = —979 (—0.55), a, 4,325 (5.94), and a4
= 269
(4.73), numbers in parantheses are t-values, R’ .62,
DW = 1.52.
2OThe respective curve is computed from estimating equa-
tion 10 with fiscal seigniorage as the dependent variable.
Denoting the estimated parameters by b yields: b,, = 1,233
(0.56), b, = 3,123 (3.51), b, = 217 (3.07), R’ = .28,
DW = 1.88.
2lWhile it may be tempting, given the evidence presented in
table 3, to conclude that the U.S. government should
prefer inflation in the 4.6 percent to 9 percent annual
range, it would be a mistake to do so. First, there are
other social (and governmental) gains from lower inflation
that are not examined here. Second, and perhaps more
relevant, the U.S. rate of inflation has been below 4.5 per-
cent for 25 of the 40 years between 1951 and 1990.
—1.0 0.5 2.0 3.5 5.0 6.5 8.0 9.5 11.0 12.5 14.0
PercentFigure 3
Estimated Seigniorage and Inflation
(in 1982/84 Consumer Prices)

















—0.3 to 45% 46 to 9.0% 9 Ito 136%
Monetary seigniorage. s~, $8,056 $15 030 511.106
Fiscal seigniorage. s $8,096 $11. 117 S 7 685
Number of years 25 10 5
Average inflation rate 2.3% 6.2% 11 1%
1Annual averages in millions of dollars. 1982/84 consumer prIcesfinance. This paper developed a new measure limits, governments are able to increase their
of monetary seigniorage and presented a frame-
work for analyzing and measuring the total
seigniorage flow from base money production
and its allocation to various uses, including fis-
cal finance, in the United States.
In addition, the paper analyzed the relation-
ship between monetary and fiscal seigniorage
and inflation in the United States from 1951 to
1990. while it is well-known that, within certain
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